Long-term re-identification via silent Bluetooth pairing
Published May 18, 2020 · Updated Aug 4, 2024
Silent Bluetooth pairing in OpenTrace-based COVIDSafe 1.0.17 and earlier allows remote attackers to obtain persistent device identifiers. A malicious BLE peripheral advertises the expected GATT service with an encrypted characteristic; the Android app reads it, silently bonds, and discloses its identity address and Identity Resolving Key. The attack requires Bluetooth proximity to an active affected app, and the recovered identifiers enable long-term re-identification of the phone.
Summary
What happened
Silent Bluetooth pairing in OpenTrace-based COVIDSafe 1.0.17 and earlier allows remote attackers to obtain persistent device identifiers. A malicious BLE peripheral advertises the expected GATT service with an encrypted characteristic; the Android app reads it, silently bonds, and discloses its identity address and Identity Resolving Key. The attack requires Bluetooth proximity to an active affected app, and the recovered identifiers enable long-term re-identification of the phone.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2020-12856
- Published
- May 18, 2020
- Updated
- Aug 4, 2024
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- Unavailable
- Attack vector
- adjacent
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 18, 2020CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 4, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
No sourced classifications are available.
Public exploit references
- Silent Pairing Issue Proof-of-Conceptfunctional · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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