Wi-Fi credential overwrite via unauthenticated Bluetooth provisioning
Published Feb 13, 2020 · Updated Aug 4, 2024
Authentication bypass in SimpliSafe Base Station firmware 1.4 allows physically proximate attackers to replace its Wi-Fi credentials. The Bluetooth LE provisioning characteristic accepts unauthenticated JSON values for the SSID, password, and token after the base-station button enables pairing. The attacker must be within Bluetooth range after the button is pressed; changing the credentials redirects the station to an attacker-chosen wireless network.
Summary
What happened
Authentication bypass in SimpliSafe Base Station firmware 1.4 allows physically proximate attackers to replace its Wi-Fi credentials. The Bluetooth LE provisioning characteristic accepts unauthenticated JSON values for the SSID, password, and token after the base-station button enables pairing. The attacker must be within Bluetooth range after the button is pressed; changing the credentials redirects the station to an attacker-chosen wireless network.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2019-3998
- Published
- Feb 13, 2020
- Updated
- Aug 4, 2024
- Vendor
- SimpliSafe
- Product
- SimpliSafe Base Station (Gen 3)
- Classifications
- CWE-287, T1565.001
- Attack vector
- adjacent
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Feb 13, 2020CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 4, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=1.4
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Public exploit references
- Bluetooth LE Wi-Fi configuration proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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