Arbitrary command execution via unsanitized cleanup path
Published Feb 24, 2020 · Updated Aug 4, 2024
OS command injection in Alex Seifert compile-sass before 1.0.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted CSS path. The setupCleanupOnExit(cssPath) function in dist/index.js interpolates cssPath directly into an rm -r shell command without neutralizing shell metacharacters. Exploitation requires a consuming Node.js application to pass attacker-controlled data as cssPath and the process to run its SIGINT cleanup handler.
Summary
What happened
OS command injection in Alex Seifert compile-sass before 1.0.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted CSS path. The setupCleanupOnExit(cssPath) function in dist/index.js interpolates cssPath directly into an rm -r shell command without neutralizing shell metacharacters. Exploitation requires a consuming Node.js application to pass attacker-controlled data as cssPath and the process to run its SIGINT cleanup handler.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2019-10799
- Published
- Feb 24, 2020
- Updated
- Aug 4, 2024
- Vendor
- Alex Seifert
- Product
- compile-sass
- Classifications
- CWE-78, T1059.004
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Feb 24, 2020CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 4, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=All versions prior to 1.0.5
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- setupCleanupOnExit command-injection proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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